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The Most Expensive Job Interview in History: Binance's $6.3 Billion Mistake

On 29 October, attackers took about $6.34 billion from Binance, the world's biggest crypto exchange. It is the largest crypto theft on record. It didn't start with a clever hack. It started with a recruiter's message, two friendly video interviews and a "coding test". I've tried to explain what happened in plain language, with pictures, and what you should do about it.

Krishna Muduli, CISSP Cybersecurity Lead Engineer November 8, 2026 13 min read
The Most Expensive Job Interview in History: Binance's $6.3 Billion Mistake — a software engineer at a nocturnal workstation on a recruiter video interview as an adjacent screen alerts to massive hot wallet asset outflows

Most of us have done a take-home coding test for a job at some point. You download the project, run it, and get on with the task. That ordinary step is how this attack got in. Nobody cracked Binance's vault. A trusted engineer was talked into opening a door, and the attackers walked the rest of the way.

$6.34B
Taken from Binance on 29 October 2026
1
Coding test that let the attackers in
~4×
Bigger than the Bybit theft, the previous record
$2.85B
Frozen or intercepted by 3 November
⚠️

This story is still moving. Binance's report of 3 November is a preliminary one, and the investigation is ongoing. I've written this with what was known on 8 November 2026 and I'll update it if anything important changes.

The short version

Who was hit
BinanceThe world's biggest crypto exchange
How much
About $6.34 billionThe largest crypto theft on record
How they got in
A fake job interviewA "coding test" hid the malware
Who did it
North KoreaThe FBI names its TraderTraitor group
Customers' money
Covered by Binance98% refilled by 31 October
Got back so far
About $2.85 billionFrozen or intercepted, as of 3 November

First, where does an exchange keep your coins?

When you buy crypto on an exchange like Binance, the exchange holds the coins for you, much like a bank holds your cash. Most of it sits in cold wallets, which are kept offline and are slow to move on purpose. A smaller amount sits in hot wallets, which stay online so that withdrawals can go out quickly.

Every withdrawal from a hot wallet needs a digital signature. Exchanges don't let a person type that signature in. A locked-down internal system, which I'll call the signing service, checks each withdrawal request and signs it if it looks right. In this attack, the criminals never stole the secret keys. They got the signing service to sign for them.

Subterranean institutional cryptocurrency cold storage vault with air-gapped Hardware Security Module, reinforced steel door, and security engineer monitoring multi-sig authorization queues

Figure 1: Anatomy of institutional crypto custody. Cold storage wallets rely on air-gapped Hardware Security Modules (HSMs) and biometric multi-custody safeguards deep inside subterranean vaults. Hot wallets operate online to process routine customer withdrawals, relying on an automated signing service to verify requests. In this attack, the adversaries never cracked the HSMs or leaked the root keys—they compromised internal credentials to instruct the signing service itself.

Institutional Custody & Key Architecture

Where An Exchange Keeps Your Coins

Binance holds over 95% of customer assets in offline vaults. The attackers never touched the private keys—they commandeered the automated signing engine that authorizes movements.

🛡️ Air-Gapped Vault
Cold Storage

Subterranean, physical HSM clusters disconnected from the internet. Requires multi-custody hardware key ceremonies and 24-48h manual timelocks.

95%+ Of Total Reserves
Status 100% Uncompromised
⚡ Instant Settlement
Online Hot Wallets

Connected directly to 10+ public blockchains (BTC, ETH, BNB, SOL) to fulfill routine customer withdrawal requests in seconds.

~5% Operational Float
Target $6.34B Siphoned
🚨 The Breach Point
Signing Service (KMS)

Automated internal microservice that evaluates withdrawal limits and signs blockchain transactions when instructed by authorized DevOps containers.

0 Keys Leaked / Stolen
Compromise Weaponized via Token
REFILL PIPELINE WEAPONIZED CALLS AIR-GAPPED COLD VAULT HSMs in Biometric Bunkers SAFE · 95%+ COINS ONLINE HOT WALLETS Fast Automated Withdrawals DRAINED: $6.34B SIGNING SERVICE (KMS) Validates & Signs Requests HIJACKED BY ADVERSARY Binance confirmed zero evidence of private key compromise. The signing engine functioned as programmed—under illicit instruction.
💡
Key Security Reality: Crypto institutional breaches rarely involve brute-forcing 256-bit elliptic curve cryptography. Attackers locate the human and deployment bridges that hold standing permissions to tell the signing service what to do.

It started with a job offer

In September, a software engineer at Binance got a message on a well-known job-hunting site. The sender said they were a Project Director at a company that, it turned out, doesn't exist. The engineer's profile mentioned his work at Binance, and that was the point. The attackers weren't looking for any developer. They wanted someone inside Binance.

What followed looked like a normal hiring process. There was a first round with an "HR" person, then a second round with someone claiming to be the company's CEO, on live video. Then came the usual next step: a take-home assessment. He was asked to download a code project and run it on the computer he had in front of him, which was his Binance laptop.

A software engineer sitting at a workstation during a live video interview on a laptop, executing a coding test that quietly triggers a hidden pyenv backdoor script

Figure 2: The deceptive interview lure. Over the shoulder of the candidate: a live, professional video call with persuasive recruiters alongside a technical assessment project in VS Code. Running ./run_tests.sh seemed routine, but the package payload silently swapped local developer binaries to establish a covert command channel into the corporate network.

Social Engineering · Kill Chain

Anatomy of the Fake Interview Exploit

How North Korea's TraderTraitor bypassed corporate endpoint detection by weaponizing the tech hiring process.

Phase 01 · Recon
🎯 Targeted Lure

Adversaries create a fictitious tech firm and approach Binance engineers on LinkedIn with personalized pitches for executive compensation and remote flexibility.

Platform LinkedIn / Job Boards
Phase 02 · Trust
📹 Video Screens

Two professional video interview rounds with live cameras ("HR Recruiter" and "CEO") establish human rapport, completely disarming security suspicion over weeks.

Verification Live Camera Faces
Phase 03 · Execution
💻 The Coding Test

Candidate downloads a technical assessment project onto their work laptop. Running ./run_tests.sh triggers hidden scripts that swap the macOS pyenv binary.

Trojan Booby-trapped pyenv
Phase 04 · Compromise
🔓 Silent Backdoor

Antivirus and EDR detect zero anomalous signatures. A persistent reverse shell opens to North Korea, allowing attackers to harvest container deploy tokens.

Detection 0 Alarms Triggered
🚨
Defensive Mandate: Never clone unknown third-party interview repositories or execute evaluation scripts on enterprise-managed laptops. Treat every take-home coding challenge as untrusted adversarial code.

Hidden inside the project was malware. Once it ran, it quietly swapped a common developer tool on the Mac (pyenv, which manages Python versions) for a booby-trapped copy and opened a command line for the attackers. Binance says its security software did not catch it.

"It was not a single isolated breach or a simple phishing incident. The attackers combined a range of techniques, including social engineering by fake recruitment interviews, malicious software downloads, compromised internal AI tooling, endpoint compromise, and an advanced transaction-authorisation method."

Binance incident report, 3 November 2026

This wasn't their first try

The part that stays with me is June. Months before the interview, an engineer on Binance's Wallet DevOps team went looking for a popular AI coding tool and installed a tampered copy of Homebrew, the app installer many Mac developers use. Binance's security team caught it, replaced his laptop and reset his passwords. But by then the attackers had learned his job and the names of his colleagues on the wallet team. They came back three months later through a different door.

From one laptop to the vault

One infected laptop isn't the same as $6 billion. Here is how the attackers got from one to the other, based on what Binance has published so far:

Prolonged APT Campaign

Five Months: From Reconnaissance to The Vault

North Korea demonstrated extraordinary persistence. When an initial lure was caught in June, they used the reconnaissance to mount the fatal September breach.

01
June 2026 Reconnaissance
The Tampered Homebrew Installer
A Binance Wallet DevOps engineer inadvertently installs a booby-trapped Homebrew package while researching an AI coding assistant. Binance security quarantines the laptop, but the attackers harvest employee directories and target team rosters.
02
September 2026 Social Engineering
The "Project Director" Recruiter Outreach
Armed with June's organizational intel, attackers contact a different Binance software engineer. Two convincing live video interviews take place with high-level fake executives.
03
September 2026 Initial Access
Coding Assessment Run on Work MacBook
The engineer runs ./run_tests.sh on their Binance computer. The hidden payload stealthily swaps pyenv with a trojanized version, opening a command-line backdoor that eludes corporate EDR.
04
20 October 2026 Lateral Movement
Internal AI Tool Pivoting
Leveraging the infected laptop and an internal Binance AI developer tool, attackers pivot laterally to compromise two more endpoints: the Wallet DevOps engineer from June and a core wallet software engineer.
05
20 – 29 October 2026 Privilege Escalation
Container Deployment Tokens Exfiltrated
On the DevOps engineer's machine, the attackers locate persistent cloud tokens capable of deploying Docker containers into production infrastructure. The final bridge to the vault is crossed.
06
29 October 2026 Exfiltration · The Heist
Signing Service Turned on Binance ($6.34B Heist)
From the wallet engineer's device, using the DevOps deployment token, attackers deploy a container and execute withdrawal commands. The automated signing engine validates the authorized credentials, broadcasting billions to attacker addresses across 10 blockchains.

Notice how little of this is "hacking" in the movie sense. Every step after the coding test used something that already existed: a colleague's laptop, an internal tool, a token left on a computer, a service that signs what it's asked to sign. The attackers just had to be patient and use what they found.

The trick that kept the money flowing

Binance noticed and paused withdrawals, but money kept leaving for a while afterwards. That's because of a feature on Ethereum called EIP-7702.

The simplest way I can put it: EIP-7702 lets a wallet give a piece of software a kind of power of attorney. The wallet keeps its secret key, but the software is allowed to act on its behalf. It's useful for legitimate things, like paying fees or bundling payments. The attackers used Binance's own signing service to grant that power of attorney over a Binance hot wallet to a program they controlled.

Curved ultrawide monitor displaying real-time Ethereum smart contract execution logs, EIP-7702 delegation designation, and automated withdrawal drain looping despite manual pause controls

Figure 3: Programmatic drain via EIP-7702 delegation. The terminal reveals the automated delegation in action. Once the compromised signing service vouched for the attacker's smart contract designation, programmatic transfers continued to broadcast directly across block confirmations, bypassing manual pause switches until the delegation itself was revoked on-chain.

Ethereum Protocol Mechanics

EIP-7702: The Smart Contract "Power of Attorney"

Why flipping the emergency withdrawal pause switch did not immediately halt the on-chain drain.

Step 01 · Hijacked Authority
Signing Service

Under adversary control, the signing KMS signed an on-chain EIP-7702 delegation authorization payload for the Binance hot wallet address.

Payload Cryptographically Valid
Step 02 · Account Abstraction
Binance Hot Wallet (EOA)

The hot wallet retained its private key, but Ethereum designated the attacker's smart contract as its authorized proxy to move funds.

Status Delegated Power Granted
Step 03 · Autonomous Loop
Attacker Contract

The smart contract executed automated sweeps directly across Ethereum mainnet blocks, completely independent of Binance's internal servers.

Execution Decentralized & Automated
🔍
The Emergency Pause Paradox: When Binance paused web UI withdrawals, the API front door was shut, but Ethereum validator nodes continued executing the on-chain EIP-7702 delegation. The drain could only be stopped when Binance deployed an on-chain transaction revoking the delegation.

Blockchain analysts at TRM Labs noticed something else that points the same way. Binance wallets on different blockchains, which use different kinds of keys, all produced valid signatures for the attackers within about half an hour. You don't get that by stealing one key. You get it by controlling the system that signs for all of them.

Where did the money go?

State-of-the-art blockchain intelligence war room with incident response analysts tracking multi-billion dollar stolen crypto flows across Bitcoin, Ethereum, and TRON networks

Figure 4: Incident response war room & multi-chain asset tracing. Forensic teams and blockchain intelligence analysts (TRM Labs, Chainalysis) map the sprawling multi-chain dispersal in real time. Over $2.85 billion in centralized stablecoins were frozen across issuers, while roughly $3.5 billion in native Bitcoin and Ether surged toward decentralized bridges and mixing protocols.

On-Chain Asset Tracing

Where The $6.34 Billion Went

Centralized stablecoin blacklists enabled immediate billions in freezes, while permissionless Layer-1 assets surged into mixing protocols.

🧊 Centralized Freeze
Stablecoins (USDT / USDC)

Tether, Circle, Paxos, Ripple, and Arbitrum's Security Council executed centralized smart contract blacklists within 24 hours, freezing the stolen tokens on-chain.

$2.85B Frozen & Recovered
Mechanism Contract Blacklist
🏃 Active Laundering
Native Crypto (ETH / BTC / SOL)

Over 420,000 ETH and 18,270 BTC have no central administrator. Attackers split and laundered these funds across cross-chain bridges and Tornado.cash mixers.

~$3.5B Permissionless Coins
Status Dispersed Across Bridges
🏦 User Backstop
SAFU & Treasury Refill

Binance deployed its corporate reserves and Secure Asset Fund for Users (SAFU) to guarantee all customer deposits. Customer accounts remained 100% solvent.

98% Refilled in 48 Hours
Customer Impact Zero User Balance Loss
📊
Forensic Implication: The crypto ecosystem's two halves behaved in total contrast: corporate-governed tokens were locked with a single administrator function call, while decentralized base-layer assets demonstrated the censorship-resistant reality of public blockchains.

Here the type of coin made a big difference. Stablecoins such as USDT and USDC are issued by companies (Tether and Circle), and those companies can freeze their own tokens. Within the first day, Tether, Circle, Ripple, World Liberty Financial and Arbitrum's Security Council had frozen about $2.7 billion. By 3 November, Binance put the total frozen or intercepted at about $2.85 billion.

Bitcoin and ether have no company in charge, so nobody can freeze them. TRM Labs reported that the attackers were still holding more than 420,000 ETH and 18,270 BTC, worth about $2.4 billion at the time. North Korean groups have laundered stolen crypto through mixers and cross-chain swaps before, and investigators expect the same this time.

🧊
FrozenAbout $2.85 billion, mostly stablecoins whose issuers stepped in.
🏃
Still out thereRoughly $3.5 billion, mostly ether and bitcoin, being moved and laundered.
🏦
Customers refilledBinance says it refilled 98% of affected coins from its reserves and SAFU fund by 31 October.

What happened next

Incident Response & Crisis Telemetry

One Week: From Theft to Public Disclosure

How Binance, blockchain forensic investigators, law enforcement, and token issuers coordinated over 7 high-stakes days.

29
OCT
Day 0 · 29 October 2026 Critical Incident
The $6.34B Heist Begins
Attackers execute automated drainage scripts through the compromised signing service. Approximately $6.34 billion leaves Binance hot wallets across 10 blockchains over several hours. Deposits and withdrawals are paused globally.
30
OCT
Day 1 · 30 October 2026 Ecosystem Defense
Initial Attribution & $2.7B Stablecoin Freeze
Binance announces a compromised DevOps endpoint with no key leakage. TRM Labs and Chainalysis trace transaction topologies to North Korea's TraderTraitor. Tether, Circle, Paxos, and Arbitrum freeze $2.7 billion in stablecoins within hours.
31
OCT
Day 2 · 31 October 2026 FBI Alert & Solvency
FBI Formally Blames North Korea; 98% Reserves Refilled
The FBI releases a flash alert tying the attack to North Korea's TraderTraitor (the group behind the 2025 Bybit $1.5B heist). Simultaneously, Binance announces that 98% of customer coin balances have been refilled using corporate treasury and SAFU insurance funds.
01
NOV
Day 3 · 1 November 2026 Service Restoration
Phased Withdrawal Resumption
Binance re-enables withdrawals in phased tiers after auditing signing systems. Secondary phishing wave begins as opportunistic cybercriminals distribute fake "$150 compensation" refund links to crypto users.
03
NOV
Day 5 · 3 November 2026 Post-Mortem
Comprehensive Preliminary Incident Report
Binance discloses the full fake recruitment interview vector, macOS pyenv trojan, internal AI tool abuse, and EIP-7702 delegation method. Affected infrastructure has been re-architected and credentials completely revoked.

Binance's co-founder Changpeng Zhao didn't soften it. He said a hack of this size "means serious security failures occurred", and described it as what "appears to have been a prolonged multi month/year attack targeting hundreds of employees and systems, with a few ultimately compromised." Binance itself said it had detected and stopped 57 North Korea-linked attempts in 2026. It only had to miss one.

Am I affected?

Threat Landscape & Exposure Analysis

Who Needs to Worry, and About What?

The theft hit Binance's internal infrastructure and liquidity pools—not customer logins. Here is how the risk breaks down.

User Funds 100% Covered
Binance Customer Balances

Binance's SAFU fund and reserves fully absorbed all losses. Your account credentials, 2FA, and personal funds were not compromised.

Risk Level Zero Direct Loss
Phishing Wave High Threat
Customer Inboxes & Social Feeds

Opportunistic scammers are circulating fake "refund" and "$150 hack compensation" portals via SMS and Twitter. Clicking them exposes your wallet or login.

Defense Never Click Compensation Links
Active Campaign Critical Target
Web3 & FinTech Software Engineers

North Korean threat actors are actively reaching out to developers on LinkedIn with fake recruitment offers and booby-trapped coding assessments.

Rule Zero Untrusted Code on Work Devices
Architectural Flaw Systemic Risk
Fintechs & Custodial Platforms

Any institution where an engineer's laptop holds persistent deployment tokens that can command a signing service shares the exact vulnerability Binance suffered.

Architecture Revoke Standing Endpoint Tokens

This has happened before

The fake job interview is not new. North Korean groups have used it for years, in campaigns researchers call Operation Dream Job and Contagious Interview. What's new is the size of the result. Put the big ones side by side:

Threat Intelligence Precedent

North Korea's Recruitment Heist Playbook

The common thread across history's largest crypto thefts: attackers never break the cryptographic vault—they manipulate the humans who hold the keys.

October 2026
Binance
$6.34B

Vector: Fake recruiter, 2 live video screens, Trojan coding test swapping pyenv, EIP-7702 smart contract delegation.

Actor TraderTraitor (FBI)
February 2025
Bybit
$1.50B

Vector: Compromised laptop of a Safe{Wallet} infrastructure developer; lateral pivot into multisig deployment tokens.

Actor TraderTraitor (FBI)
May 2024
DMM Bitcoin
$308M

Vector: Fake LinkedIn recruiter targeting Ginco (wallet vendor) engineer with a booby-trapped Python assessment test.

Actor TraderTraitor (FBI)
March 2022
Ronin Network
$625M

Vector: Fake LinkedIn recruiter contacting Sky Mavis senior engineer with a Trojanized PDF "offer letter" payload.

Actor Lazarus Group (FBI)
🎯
Tactical Consistency: In every case across four years, the breach originated through career opportunities. North Korean operators exploit the vulnerability that developers routinely inspect external code when seeking career advancement.

What you should do

If you're looking for a job

This is the part I'd most like people to read, because it's where the attack started.

💻
Never use your work computer for interviewsNo coding tests, no "quick setup", no downloads. Your work laptop has access a criminal wants. Your personal laptop doesn't.
📦
Treat every coding test as untrustedRead it before you run it, and run it in a throwaway environment: a cloud sandbox, a virtual machine or a container with nothing important in it.
🔎
Check the company is realA website, a history, people you can find elsewhere, a phone number that answers. A fake company can look good for a week. It rarely holds up after an hour of digging.

And it's fine to say no. A real employer will understand if you say "I don't run unknown code on my machine, can we do this as a screen-share or in an online editor instead?" A fake one will push.

If you use Binance or any other exchange

🚫
Ignore "compensation" offersNo exchange will ask you to claim a refund through a link, a DM or a screenshot. Check announcements only in the official app or website, typed in yourself.
🔐
Lock your account downUse a passkey or an authenticator app, not SMS. Turn on a withdrawal allow-list so money can only go to addresses you've approved.
🧺
Don't keep everything on one exchangeBinance could cover a $6 billion hole. A smaller exchange might not. Money you're holding long-term is safer in a wallet you control.

If you run security for a company that holds money

The lesson here isn't "train people better". Training helps, but Binance was clearly trying and still got caught. The real lesson is to make sure that one person's laptop can't reach the crown jewels.

Zero-Trust Engineering Playbook

What Security Teams Must Do (In Priority Order)

Human training is never enough. Security architecture must be resilient to individual endpoint compromise.

P0
Immediate Action (24 Hours) Critical Hygiene
Strip Standing Deployment Credentials from Laptops
Zero long-lived deployment tokens, cloud management keys, or signing permissions should reside on engineer laptops. Issue Just-In-Time (JIT) credentials that expire in minutes and require mandatory FIDO2 hardware token touch.
P0
Immediate Action (24 Hours) Signing Isolation
Multi-Party Verification for Automated Asset Movement
The signing service must independently reject anomalous withdrawal velocity or new protocol authorizations (such as EIP-7702 delegations) unless verified via an out-of-band channel inaccessible to developer machines.
P1
This Month (Sprint Goal) Policy & Culture
Enforce Disposable Sandboxes for Job Interviews
Establish clear, blame-free policy: zero execution of take-home tests or third-party interview binaries on corporate devices. Provide engineers with isolated cloud development containers for external coding tasks.
P1
This Month (Sprint Goal) Incident Forensics
Treat "Quarantined" Incidents as Active Reconnaissance
When a malware attempt is caught (as happened to Binance in June), never assume the threat is closed. Identify what organizational, team, and infrastructure intelligence the adversary exfiltrated, and actively harden those targets.
P2
This Quarter (Architecture) Tooling Governance
Sandbox Internal AI Tools & Package Managers
Binance confirmed attackers used an internal AI tool to pivot across developer laptops. Apply strict network isolation to internal AI assistants, restrict file system traversal, and continuously monitor package manager paths (Homebrew, pyenv, npm).
Commands: look at a coding test before you run it

A quick first look. This won't catch everything, but it catches the lazy cases and gives you a reason to ask questions. Run it from inside the project folder.

bash
# what runs automatically when you install or test? (Node projects)
grep -A15 '"scripts"' package.json

# anything that downloads, decodes or executes hidden code?
grep -rnE "curl |wget |eval\(|exec\(|base64|child_process|subprocess|os\.system" \
  --include=*.js --include=*.ts --include=*.py --include=*.sh --include=*.json . | head -50

# anything that touches your shell setup or developer tools?
grep -rnE "\.zshrc|\.bashrc|brew --prefix|pyenv|/usr/local/bin|/opt/homebrew" . | head -50
Commands: run a coding test in a throwaway container

This gives the project a copy of itself and nothing else: no network, no access to your home folder, your keys or your company's tools. When you close it, it's gone. Use a matching image (for example python:3.12) for other languages.

docker
# copy the project in read-only, with no network and no access to anything else
docker run --rm -it --network none \
  -v "$PWD":/task:ro -w /work node:22 \
  bash -c "cp -r /task/. /work && bash"

# if the test truly needs packages, install them in a separate step you can watch,
# then cut the network again before running the code

Do this on a personal machine, never a work one. A container lowers the risk; it doesn't remove it.

Commands: check your Mac's pyenv and Homebrew (the tools abused here)

This shows where pyenv really points and when it last changed. If it changed on a day you didn't update anything, or it isn't the Homebrew-managed file, stop and talk to your security team before you "fix" it. Reinstalling destroys evidence.

macOS · zsh
# every pyenv on your PATH, in the order your shell finds them
which -a pyenv

# where the Homebrew copy really lives, and when it last changed
ls -la "$(brew --prefix)/bin/pyenv"
stat -f "%Sm  %N" "$(readlink -f "$(brew --prefix)/bin/pyenv")"

# the version Homebrew thinks you have, and Homebrew's own health check
brew list --versions pyenv
brew doctor

Your quick checklist

Never run interview code on a work computer

Use a personal machine and a throwaway sandbox.

Check that the recruiter and company are real

Look them up outside the job site before the first call.

Ignore "compensation" messages about the hack

Only trust the official app or website, typed in yourself.

Turn on a passkey and a withdrawal allow-list

On every exchange account you have.

Security teams: remove standing tokens from laptops

Nothing on one computer should be enough to move money.

What I take away from this

Binance stopped 57 North Korea-linked attempts this year and still lost $6 billion to the 58th. That's the hard truth about attacks on people: the defender has to be right every time, and the attacker only once. So the goal can't just be "nobody falls for it". It has to be "when somebody falls for it, it doesn't matter much".

The June incident bothers me most, as the June clue did in my eMudhra write-up. Something was caught and cleaned up, and it looked finished. It wasn't. The attackers had learned who to go after, and they came back. When you close an incident, it's worth asking what the attacker learned, not only what they touched.

And for the rest of us, the advice is simple. Your job search is now part of your attack surface. Be friendly with recruiters, be curious about offers, and never run their code on the computer your employer trusts.

Sources


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